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ABSTRACT
This paper examines two symmetric noncooperative models of innovation: the 
model by Loury (1979) and the model by Lee and Wilde (1980). In the Loury 
model, investment in research and development is treated as an "up front" 
expenditure, while in the Lee and Wilde model the investment in research and 
development is treated as an ongoing expenditure flow that occurs throughout the 
research and development process. The effect that rivalry from competing firms 
has on the research and development investment of a given firm is studied 
through simulations using the two models. The simulations show that the 
relationship between research and development investment is negative when using 
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SYMMETRIC NQNCQQPERATIYE MODELS QFINNOVATION;
A SIMULATION STUDY
Introduction
Research concerning the impact o f market structure and firm size on 
innovation spans several decades. Kamien and Schwartz (1982) give credit to 
Joseph Schumpeter for generating interest in innovative activity. Schumpeter 
justified the existence of monopoly firms by explaining that society would benefit 
greatly from the innovations produced by these firms. He also explained that 
’’almost all monopoly positions are temporary because of their vulnerability to 
competition through innovation” (p. 10). Economists exerted much effort 
towards testing Schumpeter’s hypothesis. The focus of this effort was to 
determine if there was more research and development effort in larger firms than 
in smaller firms (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975). The evidence suggests that 
research and development effort (relative to firm size) increases up to a middle 
point and then declines. Therefore, research and development effort is expended 
the most by middle size firms, and the relationship between firm size and research 
and development effort is nonlinear.
The 1975 survey of m arket structure and innovation by Kamien and 
Schwartz noted that the innovation studies up to that date (March, 1975) had 
omitted the effect o f potential rivalry on inventive activity. Kamien and Schwartz 
(1975) believed that this was a major omission because Schumpeter had stressed 
the consequence o f potential rivalry on inventive activity (p. 3).
Two models examining the effect of rivalry on inventive activity 
appeared after the Kamien and Schwartz (1975) survey. These models were 
developed as noncooperative games in which a given firm decides on a  level o f 
research and development investment given (1) the benefits of innovative 
activity, (2) the costs of research and development, and (3) the relationships 
between rival firms.
These two models will be examined in this paper. The first is the model 
by Loury (1979), and the second is a reformulation o f the Loury model by Lee 
and Wilde (1980). These models and their underpinnings will be reviewed first, 
followed by the use of these models to examine the relationship between a firm 's 
investment in research and development and the rivalry the firm faces. The two
models produce conflicting results, which will be next topic discussed. The paper 
will then be summarized and concluded.
Review o f Models
These models involve a race to produce an innovation first - the winner 
receives a benefit, the loser receives nothing. Invention is considered to be 
deterministic in these models (Schmalensee and Willig, 1989), therefore the firm 
which commits the greatest investment will be the first to obtain the innovation. 
The cost function, with time to invention as the independent variable, is 
decreasing and convex. In other words, postponing the time to invention 
decreases costs, but at a decreasing rate.
Using the notation of Schmalensee and Willig (1989), the level of 
investment is denoted as x. Loury (1979) first assumes that the probability that 
a firm has produced an innovation by time t is equal to 1 - exp{-h(x)t}. The 
probability that a firm has produced an innovation by time t is therefore 
exponentially distributed with an expected time to introduction of l/h(x). The
at any moment.
Next, Loury assumes that the function h(x) is twice differentiable, strictly 
increasing, and satisfies the following conditions:
b. h"(x) > (<) 0 as x < (>) x ,
c. h(x)/x > (<) h’(x) as x > (<)^c , and
d. 0 < x < x < do #
_  r\j
Note that x corresponds to the point o f inflection and x is a t the maximum 
point for h(x)/x. In these models, P denotes the value of winning, and r is the 
discount rate applicable to all firms. The aggregate hazard rate is denoted a and
a. = 2 1  h(x. ). These games are symmetric, so the payoff to a given firm can be
J  0
defined as a function of its own investment (x) and the aggregate rival hazard rate 
(a). Using the Loury model, the payoff to a given firm is a function V equal to
a. h(0) = 0 = Iim h’(x) ,
x->
Ph(x)
a + h(x) + r
The best response function using the Loury model is the x value which will 
maximize V.
Lee and Wilde (1980) reformulated the Loury model by defining "x" as the 
level of research intensity. This level o f research intensity represents an 
expenditure of research and development funds over the time of the entire 
research and development process. This reformulation also allows a given firm 
to cease the ongoing research and development expenditures if a rival firm 
succeeds in producing the innovation first. This is opposed to the f,x" in the 
Loury model, which represents an expenditure committed "up front'* at the 
beginning of the innovation process. The Lee and Wilde model also adds a fixed 
cost component which is denoted as F.
The Lee and Wilde model also has a payoff function denoted V. Once 
again, the best response is the x value which maximizes V. In the Lee and Wilde 
model, the payoff to a firm (V) is equal to
Ph(x) - x
- F .
a + h(x) + r
Next, these two models will be used to  investigate the relationship between 
rivalry and research and development expenditures. Interestingly, the 
relationship is negative when using the Loury model and positive when using the 
Lee and Wilde model.
The Effect o f Rivalry with Loury M odel
Rivalry can increase through an increase in the number of competing firms 
and through an increase in the investment in research and development made by 
competing firms. We will look a t the effect that increasing the number o f firms 
has on the best response am ount o f research and development expenditure 
(denoted as x*) for a given firm in what will be called game 1. In game 2, the 
number o f firms will be fixed but the amount that firms other than our given firm 
will increase. We will then observe the effect o f the expenditure am ount o f ’’other 
firms” on x*.
meet the requirements listed in the last section. The chosen function is
x  
3 x
= — —--------  ? for x ^  0 .
x +60
Figure 1 graphs the function h(x) and Figure 2 graphs h(x)/x and h’(x) against x 
as the independent variable. These figures clearly show that the chosen function 
for h(x) meets the criteria that is required for h(x). The function h(x) is zero when 
x is equal to zero, and as x approaches infinity, h’(x) approaches zero. This meets 
the first condition. Point A in Figures 1 and 2 is the inflection point of the 
function h(x). This is the point which corresponds to x, where h”(x) changes from 
positive to negative (and where h’(x) is maximum). Point B in Figures 1 and 2 is 
the point where h(x)/x is a t a maximum. This is the point corresponding to x (the 
point where h(x)/x begins to be greater than the derivative of h(x) with respect 
to x). The value for x corresponding to Point B (which is x) is greater than the 
value for x corresponding to Point A (which is x). Therefore, the final condition 
for the function h(x) is satisfied ( 0 < x < x < ° ° ) .  See Table 1 for data used in
generating Figures 1 and 2 (note that Point A is at x = 4.5 and Point B is at 
x = 8).
W ith a suitable h(x) now chosen, the games can be "played." The game 
spreadsheets are included towards the end o f this report (see the Table o f 
Contents). The variables used in calculating the best response function, along 
with their assigned numerical value, are located a t the top o f each spreadsheet. 
At the top right-hand side o f the game spreadsheet are the rivalry variables 
(investment by other firms and number o f firms) which will be increased as the 
games progress in order to observe the change in the x* (the value in "x" column 
corresponding to the maximum "V" value, also indicated by arrow on left side 
indicating "best response"). For example, in game 1, investment by other firms 
[ x(other)] is held constant (at 5) as the game progresses and number o f firms (n) 
is increased one unit per step.
The outcome of game 1 is graphed in Figure 3; the number of firms is the 
independent variable and x* is the dependent variable. The outcome of game 2 
is graphed in Figure 4; the investment in research and development is the 
independent variable. In both games, as rivalry increases, the x* decreases.
The Effect o f Rivalry with Lee and Wilde Model
Games 3 and 4 are identical to games 1 and 2 (respectively) except that 
games 3 and 4 are "played" with the model by Lee and Wilde (1980). Note also 
that the same function as before is used for h(x) in games 3 and 4. These games 
are graphed in Figures 5 and 6. In both o f these games, as rivalry increases, the 
x* increases as well. Therefore, treating x as a continuous expenditure flow over 
time of development (rather than an up front expense) and the addition of a fixed 
cost variable drastically changes the outcome that these models produce. In their 
work, Lee and Wilde (1980) noted this inconsistency between their model and the 
model of Loury (1979). Lee and Wilde concluded that "if fixed costs are more 
important than variable costs in the R & D  technology (in some appropriate 
sense), then an increase in rivalry should lead to a decrease in the equilibrium level 
of firm investment in R & D. Similarly, if  variable costs are more im portant than 
fixed, then an increase in rivalry should lead to an increase in the equilibrium level 
of firm investment in R & D."
Conclusion
Two symmetric noncooperative models o f innovation were examined, 
beginning with a review of their mathematical derivations. The model by Loury 
(1979) used a stochastically determined benefit and cost of investing in research 
and development in an innovation race. The investment was considered to  be an 
"up front” expenditure. The model by Lee and Wilde (1980) built on the 
assumptions of the Loury model but considered investment in research and 
development to be an ongoing expenditure flow that could be terminated in the 
event that a competing firm successfully developed the innovation first.
The models were used in simulations to examine the relationship between 
rivalry and investment in research and development. The relationship between 
rivalry and investment in research and development produced by each model 
differed dramatically from the other. The simulation using the Loury model 
produced a negative relationship between rivalry and investment, while the 
simulation using the Lee and Wilde model produced a positive relationship.
The extreme difference in outcomes resulting from the use of these two 
models indicates the need for increased empirical studies regarding innovation
and competitive rivalry. The literature on the theoretical side of this issue is rich, 
however the empirical side appears to be lacking. Gathering specific data 
regarding research and development expenditures and industry rivalry would be 
challenging. However, the effort would be worth the benefit of confirming or 
disproving the many theorems that now exist regarding innovation. The 
multitudes of assumptions which may be "stabs in the dark" could be 
narrowed, and sound innovation theories could be reliably applied to such policy 






































































Results of G a m e  1
N um ber o f F irm s (n )
FIGURE 4
Results of G a m e  2












































Results of G a m e  3
N u m b e r o f  F irm s (n )
FIGURE 6
Results of G a m e  4
Investm ent Intensity b y  Other Firm s
D a t a  Used t o G r a p h  t h e F u n c t i o n  h
x h ( x ) h (x ) />: d h / d x
0 0 0.  000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 5 0.  012 0 . 0 2 4 9 0 . 0 2 4 9
1 . 0 0.  049 0 . 0 4 9 2 0 „ 0 7 3 5
1 . 5 0 .  108 0 . 0 7 2 3 0 . 1 1 8 5
2 .  0 0.  188 0 . 0 9 3 8 0 . 1 5 8 1
crtl w 0.  2 8 3 0 . 1 1 3 2 0 .  1.910
3 .  0 0.  391 0 . 1 3 0 4 0 . 2 1 6 6
3.  5 0.  509 0 . 1 4 5 3 0 . 2 3 4 7
4» 0 0.  632 0 . 1 5 7 9 0 . 2 4 5 9
4.  5 0.  757 0 . 1 6 8 2 0 .  .2509
5 .  0 0.  882 0 . 1 7 6 5 0 . 2 5 0 7
5 . 5 1 „ 006 0 . 1 8 2 8 0 . 2 4 6 4
6 .  0 1. 125 0 .  .1.875 0 . 2 3 8 9
6.  5 1. 240 0 . 1 9 0 7 O.  v 2'c? p
7 „ 0 1. 349 0 . 1 9 2 7 0 „ 2 1 8 0
7.  5 1. 452 0 . 1 9 3 5 0 . 2 0 6 0
8 0 1» 548 0 . 1 9 3 5 0 . 1 9 3 5
8 . 5 1. 639 0 . 1 9 2 8 0 . 1 8 1 1
9 .  0 1 . 723 0 .  19.1.5 0.  1.689
9.  5 1 .  802 0 .  1.897 0 .  1.572
i o „ o 1 . 875 0 . 1 8 7 5 0 .  1.460
1 0 . 5 1 . 943 0 . 1 8 5 0 0 . 1 3 5 5
11 .  0 2.  006 0 . 1823 0 . 1 2 5 6
1 1 . 5 2.  064 0 . 1 7 9 5 0 . 1164
1 2 . 0 2.  118 0 . 1 7 6 5 0 . 1 0 7 9
i '*** Kir 2.  168 0 .  1.734 0 . 1 0 0 0
1 3 . 0 2 . 2 1 4 0 . 1 7 0 3 0 . 09 2 7
13.  5 '•*> cs* **7 it v.J / 0 . 1 6 7 2 0 „ 08 6 0
14 „ 0 0 .  1.641 0 . 07 9 8
1 4 . 5 2.  334 0 .  1.610 0 . 0 7 4 2
15 „ 0 2.  368 0 .  1.579 0 . 0 6 8 9
1 5 . 5 2 .  400 0 . 1 5 4 9 0 . 06 4 2
1 6 . 0 2.  430 0 .  15.1.9 0 . 0 5 9 8
1 6 . 5 2.  458 0 .  1.490 0 . 0 5 5 7
1 7 . 0 2.  484 0 1  461 0 . 0 5 2 0
17.  5 2 .  509 0 . 1 4 3 3 0 . 0 4 8 6
1 8 .  0 /•*H cr -if j 0 .  1.406 0 . 0 4 5 4
18.  5 2 . 553 0 . 1 3 8 0 0 . 0 4 2 5
1 9 .  0 O  t~r “7 ^ 0 .  1.354 0 „ 0 3 9 9
1 9 . 5 2 . 5 9 1 0 . 1 3 2 9 0 . 0 3 7 4
2 0 .  0 2.  609 0 . 1 3 0 4 0 . 0 3 5 1
2 0 .  5 2.  625 0 . 1 2 8 1 0 . 0 3 3 0
21 . 0 2.  641 0 .  1.257 0.  031.0
2 1 . 5 2.  655 0 . 1 2 3 5 0 . 0 2 9 2
2 2 0 2.  669 0 . 1 2 1 3 0 . 0 2 7 6
cr 2.  682 0 . 1 1 9 2 0 . 0 2 6 0
23 „ 0 2.  694 0 .  .1171 0 . 0 2 4 6
":|j cr 2 . 706 0 .  1. 1.51 0 . 0 2 3 2
2 4 .  0 2.  717 0 . 1 1 3 2 0 , 0 2 2 0
2 4 .  5 0 .  1. 113 0 . 0 2 0 8
2 5 .  0 2.  737 0 . 1 0 9 5 0 .  01.97
« 5 2.  747 0 . 1 0 7 7 0 . 0 1 8 7
2 6 . 0 '*•> -jcrcrol.. H / \J 0 . 1 0 6 0 0 . 0 1 7 7
( P a i n t  A)
( P a i n t  B)
B E S T
i S F ’ O N S E
x h < x ) V
0. 5 0.0124 0.1257
1. 0 0-0492 1.3338
1 „ 5 O- 1084 3.4704
2. 0 0.1875 6-0138
2.5 0- 2830 S . 6832
3. 0 0 .3913 11 - 2432
3-5 0„5087 13.5573
4 - 0 U .6316 15.5665
4-5 0.7570 17.2611
5. 0 0 .8824 18.6593
5-5 1.0055 19-7916
6- 0 1 - 1250 20.6923
6- 5 1 - 2396 21.3945
7. 0 1 - 3486 21 - 9283
7-5 1 - 4516 22.3199
8. 0 1 - 5484 22.5916
8-5 1.6389 22.7621
9- 0 1.7234 22.8470
9.5 1.8020 22.8594
10 - 0 1« 8750 22.8101
10.5 1.9427 22- 7081




13. 0 2-2140 21-6331
13.5 2 .2570 21.3370
14 - 0 2 .2969 21.0216
14.5 2-3340 20.6890
15. 0 2 .3684 20.3414
15.5 2 .4005 19.9804
:i. 6 - 0 2 .4304 19.6075
r  -  
a ~ 1.
B E S T
R E S P O N S E  = = = = = = = >
h (x ) V
0 . 0 1 2 4  - 0 . 1 6 8 4
0 . 0 4 9 2  0 . 2 8 4 8
0 . 1 0 8 4  1 . 2 4 7 7
0 . 1 8 7 5  2 . 5 6 8 3
0 . 2 8 3 0  4 . 0 8 8 8
0 . 3 9 1 3  5 . 6 7 2 5
0 . 5 0 8 7  7 . 2 1 5 8
0 . 6 3 1 6  8 . 6 5 0 4
0 . 7 5 7 0  9 . 9 3 7 3
0 . 8 8 2 4  1 1 . 0 6 0 0
1 . 0 0 5 5  1 2 . 0 1 6 6
1 . 1 2 5 0  1 2 . 3 1 4 6
1 . 2 3 9 6  1 3 . 4 6 5 9
1 . 3 4 8 6  1 3 . 9 8 4 8
1 . 4 5 1 6  1 4 . 3 8 5 9
1 . 5 4 8 4  1 4 . 6 8 3 0
1 . 6 3 8 9  14 . 8891
1 . 7 2 3 4  1 5 . 0 1 5 5
1 . 8 0 2 0  1 5 . 0 7 2 4
1 . 8 7 5 0  1 5 . 0 6 8 8
1 . 9 4 2 7  1 5 . 0 1 2 3
2 . 0 0 5 5  1 4 . 9 0 9 6
2 . 0 6 3 7  1 4 . 7 6 6 5
2 . 1 1 7 6  1 4 . 5 8 7 9
2 . 1 6 7 6  14. 3781
2 . 2 1 4 0  1 4 . 1 4 0 8  
2 . 2 5 7 0  1 3 . 8 7 9 3
2 . 2 9 6 9  1 3 . 5 9 6 2
2 . 3 3 4 0  1 3 . 2 9 4 0
2 . 3 6 8 4  1 2 . 9 7 4 8
2 . 4 0 0 5  1 2 . 6 4 0 5








































B E S T
■’ E S P Q N S E
x h  (x ) V
0. 5 0.0124 -0.2745
l. o 0.0492 -0.1206
1, 5 0.1084 0.3987
2. 0 0. .1.875 1»1947
2. 5 0.2830 2.1702
3. 0 0.3913*p* cr 0.5087 4.3117




W t* W 1 . 0055 7.8979
6 » U 1.1250 8.5272
6.5 1.2396 9.0469
7.0 1 . 3486 9.4640
" 7  cr
/ R W 1 . 4516 9.7866
S. 0 1„ 5484 10.0236
8. 5 1 . 6389 10.1838
9 .  0 1 . 7234 10 . 2755
9.5 1 . 8020 10.3063
.10.  0 1„8750 10.2832
10. 5 1 . 9427 10.2123
11.0 2 . 0055 10 . 0993
11.5 2.0637 9.9489
12.0 2.1176 9.7654
12. 5 2.1676 9.5526
13 .  0 2.2140 9.3136
13.5 2.2570 9.0515
14 .  0 2.2969 8.7687
14. 5 2.3340 8.4674
15 .  0 2.3684 8.1495
15. 5 2.4005 7.8169







5 2 9 4 1 1
B E S T
i E S P O N S E
x h (x ) V
Ou 5 0.0124 --0. 3291
1. 0 0.0492 -0.3315
1.5 0.1084 -0.0495
2. 0 0.1875 0.4562
2. 5 0.2830 1.1169
3. 0 0.3913 1.8661T CTo » D 0.5087 2.6460
4. 0 0.6316 3.4112
4. 5 0.7570 4.1290
5. 0 0.8824 4.7784
5. 5 1.0055 5.3474
6. 0 1.1250 5.8311
6.5 1.2396 6.2295
7. 0 1.3486 6.5457
7. 5 1.4516 6.7846
8. 0 1.5484 6.9522
8. 5 1.6389 7.0546
9.0 .1.7234 7.0981
9. 5 1.8020 7.0887
10. 0 1.8750 7.0318
10. 5 1.9427 6.9325
11. 0 2.0055 6.7955
11.5 2.0637 6.6246
12. 0 2.1176 6.4237
12. 5 2.1676 6.19 6 0
13. 0 2.2140 5.9443
13.5 2.2570 5.6711
14. 0 2.2969 5.3787
14.5 2.3340 5.0691
15.0 2.3684 4.7440
15. 5 2.4005 4.4049
1 6 . 0 2.4304 4 . 0533
r  =
a = 4.41
B E S T
R E S P O N S E  = = = = = = = >
























2.1176 3 . 9716
2.1676 3.7262
2.2140 3 . 4590









































P  =  5 0
r  =  0 .  1





3  „ 0
3 .  5
4. 0
4  „ 5
6. 0 
6.5 
7 .  0 
7 .  5
B E S T  8.0
R E S P O N S E  = = = = = = = >  8.5
9 . 0 














h (X  ) V
0. 0124 ”0» 3849
0. 0492 -0. 5482
0. 1084 — 0. 5147
0. 1875 ~0.3204
0. 2830 “0 „0074
0. 3913 0. 38.1.8
0. 5087 0. 8086
0. 6316 1. 2407
0. 7570 1. 6534
0. 8824 0291
1. 0055 /7*' 3562
1. 1250 6285
1. 2396 .-*> 8432
1. 3486 .3 0006










'" y 16  7 6 1 .
■Ti 2140 1 . 5501
2570 1 . 2493
O 2969 0. 9322
O 3340 0. 6005
3684 0 . 2 5 5 5
O 4005 - 0 . 1 0 1 6
4304 — 0 . 4694
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
X h (x ) V
0. 5 0.0124 -0.4010
1 0 0.0492 -0.6113
1 „ 5 0.1084 -0.6509
2. 0 0.1875 -0.5497'"1 cr 0.2830 —0. 342T1'
3 . 0 0.3913 -0,0657
3.5 0.5087 0.2483
4. 0 0.6316 0.5713
4 „ 5 0.7570 0.8815
5. 0 0.8824 1.1627
5 5 1.0055 1.4043
6. 0 1.1250 1.5998
6. 5 1.2396 1.7464
7 „ 0 1.3486 1.8433
7. 5 1.4516 1.8918
8 „ 0 1.5484 1.8940
S. 5 1.6389 1.8528
9„ 0 1.7234 1.7714
9 „ 5 1.8020 1.6531
10 „ 0 1.8750 1„5010
10. 5 1.9427 1.3182
11.0 2.0055 1„1077
11.5 2.0637 0.8721
12. 0 2.1176 0 .6139
12.5 2« 16 76 0.3352
13. 0 2.2140 0.0380
13. 5 2.2570 -0.2758
14 „ 0 2.2969 —0.6046
14.5 2.3340 ■~0. 9469
15.0 2.3684 --1 . 3016
15. 5 2.4005 --1 . 6674
16. 0 2.4304 -2.0433
r  = 
a = 7.
B E S T










































































B E S T
R E S P O N S E
0. cr 0.0124 —0. 4227
1. 0 0.0492 —0. 6961
1 .5 0.1084 —0. 8347
0 0.1875 —0. 8607crb 0.2830 —0. 8000
0 0.3913 —0. 6798
5 0.5087 “0. 5254
4. 0 0.6316 -0. 3588
4. 5 0.7570 ”0. 1979
b .0 0.8324 —0. 0560
5. crb 1.0055 0. 0575
6. o 1.1250 0. 1367
6 .crb 1.2396 0« 1784
7. 0 1.3486 0. 1813
7. 5 1.4516 0. 1459
9 . 0 1.5484 0. 0733
8 . 5 1.6389 -0. 0345
9 . 0 1.7234 —0. 1752
9 . 5 1.8020 ~0. 3465
10. 0 1.8750 - ~ o .5458
10. crb 1.9427 "0. 7707
11. 0 2.0055 ~ i .0190
11. b 2.0637 - 1 .2885
12. 0 2.1176 - 1 .5773
12. crb 2.1676 -1. 8835
13. o 2.2140 2056
13. 5 2.2570 _'*> 5419
14. 0 2.2969 _ 8912
14. 5 2.3340 mJw \J
15. 0 2.3684 — „6239
15. 5 2.4005 -4. 0052
16. 0 2. 4-304 -4. 3953
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
x h (>:) V
0. 5 0.0124 -0.1290
1. 0 0.0492 0.4343
1 . 5 0. 1084- 1.5568
2- 0 0.1875 3.0601
2n 5 0.2830 4.7635
3 . 0 0.3913 6.5137*T ET->« D 0.5087 8.1992
4. 0 O .6316 9.7491
4. 5 0.7570 1 1.1263
5. 0 0.8824 12.3175
5.5 1.0055 13.3250
6. 0 1„1250 14.1597
6.5 1.2396 14.8371
7. 0 1.3486 15.3738
7.5 1.4516 15.7867
a. 0 1.5484 16.0911
8.5 1.6389 16.3012
9. 0 1.7234 16.4293
9. 5 1.8020 16.4862
10 . 0 1.8750 16.4814
10. 5 1.9427 16.4229
:i. l „ o 2.0055 16.3177
i i. 5 2.0637 16.1717
12. 0 2.1176 15.9900
12.5 2.1676 15.7770
1 3. 0 2.2140 15.5365
13. 5 2.2570 15. 27.18
1 4 .  0 2.2969 1 4 . 9856
14.5 2 . 3340 14.6804
1 5. 0 2 .3684 14.3584
15.5 2 . 4005 1 4. 0 2 1 2
1 6 . 0 2 » 4304 13.6706
r  -
B E S T
R E S P O N S E  = = = = = = = >
(other) = 
n -•=






































































B E S T






x h (x ) V
0.5 0.0124 -0.3291
1. 0 0.0492 -0.3315
1. 5 0.1084 “0.0495
2. 0 0.1875 0.4562“J CTj 0.2830 1.1169
3» 0 0.3913 1.3661
3.5 0.5087 2.6460
4. 0 O .6316 3.4112
4. 5 0.7570 4.1290
5. 0 0.8824 4.7784
5» 5 1.0055 5.3474
6. 0 1.1250 5.8311
6. 5 1.2396 6.2295
7. 0 1.3486 6.5457
7.5 1.4516 6.7846
8. 0 1.5484 6.9522
8. 5 1.6389 7.0546
9. 0 1.7234 7.0981
9.5 1.8020 7.0887
10. 0 1.8750 7.0318
10. 5 1.9427 6.9325
11. 0 2.0055 6.7955
11.5 2.0637 6.6246
12. 0 2.1176 6.4237
12.5 2.1676 6.19&0
13. 0 2.2140 5.9443
13.5 2.2570 5.6711
14.0 2 2969 5.3787
14. 5 2.3340 5.0691
15. 0 2.3684 4.7440
15. 5 2.4005 4.4049
16. 0 2.4304 4„0533
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
x h  ( x  ) V
0 .  5 0 . 0 1 2 4 ~ U . 3 6 5 1
1 .  0 0 . 0 4 9 2 ~ 0 »  4 7 1  1
1 .  5 0 . 1 0 8 4 - 0 . 3 4 8 5
2 .  0 0 . 1 8 7 5 - 0 . 0 4 1 8
' P  5
0 . 2 8 3 0 0 . 3 9 8 0
3 .  0 0 . 3 9 1 3 0 . 9 1 9 9
t  c r  
.  U 0 . 5 0 8 7 1 . 4 7 8 3
4 .  0 0 . 6 3 1 6 2 . 0 3 6 2
4 .  5 0 . 7 5 7 0 2 . 5 6 5 6
5 .  0 0 . 8 8 2 4 3 . 0 4 7 2
5 . 5 1 . 0 0 5 5 3 . 4 6 9 2
6 .  0 1 . 1 2 5 0
~ r  q  o  K-” ; t
•» ' a O  2 .  u J  •«»
6 . 5 1 . 2 3 9 6 4 . 1 1 3 8
7 .  0 1 . 3 4 8 6 4 . 3 3 5 6
7 . 5 1 . 4 5 1 6 4 . 4 9 3 6
8 . 0 1 . 5 4 8 4 4 . 5 9 1 8
8 .  5 1 . 6 3 8 9 4 . 6 3 4 8
9 .  0 1 . 7 2 3 4 4 . 6 2 7 2
9 .  5 1 . 8 0 2 0 4 . 5 7 3 7
1 0 .  0 1 . 8 7 5 0 4 . 4 7 8 8
1 0 . 5 1 . 9 4 2 7 4 . 3 4 6 5
1 1 . 0 2 . 0 0 5 5 4 . 1 8 0 7
1 1 . 5 2 . 0 6 3 7 3 . 9 8 4 7
1 2 .  0 2 . 1 1 7 6 3 . 7 6 1 8
1 2 .  5 2 . 1 6 7 6 3 . 5 1 4 7
1 3 . 0 2 . 2 1 4 0 3 . 2 4 5 8
1 3 .  5 2 . 2 5 7 0 2 . 9 5 7 5
1 4 . 0 2 . 2 9 6 9 2 . 6 5 1 6
1 4 . 5 2 . 3 3 4 0 2 . 3 2 9 9
1 5 . 0 2 . 3 6 8 4 1 . 9 9 4 0
1 5 .  5 2 . 4 0 0 5 1 . 6 4 5 2
1 6 .  0 2 . 4 3 0 4 1 . 2 8 4 8
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
h  < x ) V
0.5 0.0124 -0.3870
1. 0 0.0492 -0.5564
1. 5 0.1084 _(") CjTDT
2.0 0.1875 -0.3501
nr 0.2830 -~0. 0507
3 . 0 0.3913 0„3241
3. 5 0.5087 0.7365
4« 0 0.6316 1.1548
4. 5 0.7570 1.5546
5. 0 0.8824 1.9184
5. 5 1.0055 2.2349
6. 0 1.1250 2.4976
6.5 1.2396 2.7040
7. 0 1.3486 2.8539
7. 5 1.4516 2.9491
8.0 1.5484 2.9926
8. 5 1.6389 2.9877
9.0 1.7234 2.9384
9.5 1.8020 2.8484
10. 0 1.8750 2.7214
10.5 1.9427 2.5609
:f. i. o 2.0055 2.3701
11.5 2.0637 o X 5  ^ ̂
12.0 2.1176 1.9097
12. 5 2.1676 1.6451
13. 0 2.2140 1.3607
13.5 2.2570 1.0583
14.0 2.2969 0 . 7399
1 4 . 5 2.3340 0.4069
1 5 .  0 2.3684 0.0607
15. 5 2.4005 - 0 . 2 9 7 3
1 6 . 0 2.4304 •~0. 6661
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
h (x > V
0. 5 0.0124 -0.4013
1 „ 0 0.0492 “0.6123
1 . 5 0.1084 -0.6531
2. 0 0.1875 “0.5535
2 » 5 0.2830 -0.3483
3. 0 0.3913 -0.0732
3.5 0.5087 0.2339
4. 0 O .6316 0.5601
4. 5 0.7570 0.8634
5. 0 0.8824 1.1480
5. 5 1.0055 1.3881
6. 0 1.1250 1„5823
6 . 5 1.2396 1.7277
7. 0 1.3486 1.8236
7. 5 1.4516 1.8711
8. 0 1.5484 1.8725
8. 5 1.6389 1 .8306
9. 0 1.7234 1.7485
9.5 1.8020 1.6296
10. 0 1.8750 1„4769
10. 5 1.9427 1.2937
1 1 . 0 2.0055 1.0828
11.5 2.0637 0.8469
12. 0 2.1176 0 . 5 8 8 3
12. 5 2 . 1676 0 . 3 0 9 3
1 3. 0 2.2140 0. 011 9
13. 5 2.2570 -0.3022
14. 0 2.2969 “ 0 . 6 3 1 2
1 4 . 5 2.3340 -~0. 9738
1 5. 0 2 . 3684 - 1 „3286
15. 5 2.4005 — 1.6946
16 „ 0 2 . 4304 - 2 . 0706
r  =
a = 6.
B E S T
R E S P O N S E  = = = = = = = >






























2.3684 - 2 . 3509
2 . 4005 -2.7234
2 . 4304 ~3.1054
5 0
0 .  1
8 9 3 6 1 7
0 .  5
1 .  0
1  .  5
2 .  0r>M w
3 .  0
3 .  5
4 ,  0
4 .  5
5 .  0
5 . 5
6 .  0
6 . 5
7 .  0
7 .  5
8 .  0
8 .  5
9 .  0
9 . 5
1 0 .  0
1 0 .  5
1 1 .  0
1 1 . 5
1 2 .  0
1 2 . 5
1 3 .  0
1 3 . 5
1 4 .  0
1 4 .  5
1 5  „  0
1 5 .  5
1 6 .  0
!> 
10
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
50 x (other) =
0- 1 n =
7.5
x h (x ) V
0 „ 5 0.0124 -0.4182
1 . 0 0.0492 -0.6785
1. 5 0.1084 -0.7967
2. 0 0.1875 —0.7961
2 5 0.2830 -0.7049
3 * 0 0.3913 -0.5517
3.5 0.5087 -0.3635




6 . 0 1.1250 0 . 4 4 7 0
6. 5 1.2396 0.5117
7.0 1.3486 0.5354
7. 5 1.4516 0.5185
8. 0 1.5484 0.4626
8. 5 1.6389 0.3697
9 „ 0 1.7234 0.2424
9. 5 1.8020 0.0831
10. 0 1.8750 -0.1055
10. 5 1.9427 .0.3209
11. 0 2.0055 —0.5606
11.5 2.0637 -0.8223
12. 0 2.1176 -1.1041
12.5 2.1676 -1.4040
13. 0 2.2140 1 „ 7203
1 3 .5 2.2570 -2.0 5 1 4
1 4 . 0 2.2969 -2.3960
1 4 . 5 2.3340 _O **7 CLj o ~7
1 5 . 0 2.3684 -3.1204
15. 5 2.4005 -3.4931
16. 0 2.4304 “3.8849
10
5
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
x h  ( x  ) V
0 .  5 0 . 0 1 2 4 - 0 . 4 2 3 5
1 .  0 0 . 0 4 9 2 ~ 0 . 6 9 9 1
i „  5 0 . 1 0 8 4 - 0 . 8 4 1 3
2 .  0 0 . 1 8 7 5 “ 0 . 8 7 1 8
2  a 5 0 . 2 Q 3 0 - 0 . 8 1 6 4
•3  a 0 O a  3 9 1 3 - 0 . 7 0 1 8
3 . 5 0 a 5 0 8 7 - 0 . 5 5 3 3
4  a 0 O . 6 3 1 6 - 0 . 3 9 2 5
4 .  5 0 . 7 5 7 0 - 0 . 2 3 7 1
5 .  0 0 . 8 8 2 4 “ 0 . 1 0 0 5
5 .  5 1 . 0 0 5 5 0 . 0 0 8 2
6  a 0 1 » 1 2 5 0 0 . 0 8 3 0
6 .  5 1 . 2 3 9 6 O a 1 2 0 6
7  a 0 1 . 3 4 8 6 0 . 1 2 0 0
7 . 5 1 . 4 5 1 6 O a  0 8 1 2
8  a 0 1 . 5 4 8 4 0 . 0 0 5 7
8  a 5 1 . 6 3 8 9 “ O a 1 0 4 7
9 . 0 1 . 7 2 3 4 - 0 „ 2 4 7 8
9  a 5 1 . 8 0 2 0 ~ 0  a 4 2 1  1
1  0  a 0 1 . 8 7 5 0 - 0 . 6 2 2 3
1 0 .  5 1 . 9 4 2 7 - 0 . 8 4 8 9
1  1  a 0 2 . 0 0 5 5 - I . 0 9 8 7
1 1 . 5 2 . 0 6 3 7 - 1 . 3 6 9 6
1 2 .  0 2 . 1 1 7 6 - 1 „ 6 5 9 7
1 2 .  5 2 . 1 6 7 6 - l a  9 6 7 0
1 3 . 0 2 . 2 1 4 0 - 2 «  2 9 0 1
1 3 .  5 2 . 2 5 7 0 • ~ 2 .  6 2 7 3
1 4 . 0 2 . 2 9 6 9 - • 2 .  9 7 7 4
1 4 .  5 2 . 3 3 4 0
_"T cp o
1 5 .  0 2 . 3 6 8 4 - 3 . 7 1 1 6
1 5 .  5 2 . 4 0 0 5 • ~ 4 .  0 9 3 6
1 6  „  0 2 . 4 3 0 4 ” 4 . 4 8 4 3
P = 40 x (other) ~ 4
r  — 0 . 1  n ”  2
a = 0.631578
F = 10
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
K h (x) V
1 . 0 0.0492 -8.7612
2 „ 0 0. .1.875 -4. 0157
3. 0 0.3913 1.2676
4. 0 0.6316 5.5985
5. 0 0.8824 8.7704
6. 0 1.1250 11„0064
7. 0 1.3486 12.5675
8.0 1.5484 13.6563
9.0 1.7234 14.4141
10 „ 0 1.8750 14.9369
11.0 2.0055 .15. 2899
12. 0 2.1176 15.5178
13.0 2.2140 15.6519
14. 0 2.2969 15.7144
15. 0 2.3684 15.7216
16. 0 2.4304 15.6851
17. 0 2.4842 15.6139
1 8. 0 2.5313 15. 5.147
19. 0 2.5724 15.3926
20. 0 2.6087 15.2518
21. 0 2.6407 15.0953
2 . 2 . 0 2.6691 .1. 4. 9257
23. 0 2.6944 14.7450
24. 0 2.7170 14.5550
25. 0 14.3568
26. 0 2.7554 14.1517
27. 0 2 . 7719 1 3 . 9406
28. 0 2 . 7867 1 3 . 7242
29. 0 2.8002 13.5033
30. 0 a Q  J. 13.2783
3 1  . 0 2.8237 1 3 . 0497




2 6 3 1 5 7  
10
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
h  ( x  ) V
1 .  0 0 . 0 4 9 2 - 9 . 3 1 5 2
2 .  0 0 . 1 8 7 5 - 6 . 4 5 3 1
3 .  0 0 . 3 9 1 3 - 2 . 7 8 8 6
4 .  0 O . 6 3 1 6 0 . 6 5 9 6
5 .  0 0 . 8 8 2 4 3 . 4 9 1 0
6 .  0 1 . 1 2 5 0 5 . 6 7 4 2
7 . 0 1 . 3 4 8 6 7 . 3 1 1 5
S .  0 1 . 5 4 8 4 8 . 5 2 4 7
9 .  0 1 . 7 2 3 4 9 . 4 1 8 4
1 0 .  0 1 . 8 7 5 0 1 0 . 0 7 3 1
1 1  .  0 2 . 0 0 5 5 1 0 . 5 4 8 4
1 2 . 0 2 . 1 1 7 6 1 0 . 8 8 7 7
1 3 .  0 2 . 2 1 4 0 1 1 . 1 2 2 8
1 4 . 0 2 . 2 9 6 9 1 1 . 2 7 7 1
1 5 .  0 2 . 3 6 8 4 1 1  .  3 6 8 . 1 .
1 6 .  0 2 . 4 3 0 4 1 1 . 4 0 8 8
1 7 .  0 2 . 4 8 4 2 1 1 . 4 0 9 2
i  a .  o 2 . 5 3 1 3 1 1 . 3 7 6 8
1 9 .  0 1 1 . 3 1 7 7
2 0 .  0 2 . 6 0 8 7 1 1 . 2 3 6 4
2 1 . 0 2 . 6 4 0 7 1 1 . 1 3 6 7
2 2 .  0 2 . 6 6 9 1 1 1 . 0 2 1 6
2 3 .  0 2 .  6 9 4 4 1 0 . 8 9 3 3
2 4 .  0 2 . 7 1 7 0 1 0 . 7 5 4 0
2 5 .  0 1 0 . 6 0 5 2
2 6 .  0 2 . 7 5 5 4 1 0 . 4 4 8 1
2 7 .  0 2 . 7 7 1 9 1 0 . 2 8 3 9
2 8 .  0 2 . 7 8 6 7 1 0 . 1 1 3 6
2 9 .  0 2 . 8 0 0 2 9 . 9 3 7 9
3 0 .  0
o a i  ■=;jL .  O  X  . u 9 . 7 5 7 4
3 1 .  0 2 . 8 2 3 7 9 . 5 7 2 7
r  ~ 
a = 1. 
F  =
B E S T
R E S P O N S E  = = = = = = = >































•i g  o ~J 7.0072
2.8339 6.8489
4 0
0 .  1
8 9 4 7 3 6
1 0
1 .  0
2 .  0
3 .  0
4 . 0
5 .  0
6 .  0
7 .  0
8 . 0
9 . 0
1 0 .  0
1  1  .  0
1 2 .  0
1 3 .  0
1 4 .  0
1 5 . 0
1 6 . 0
1 7 . 0
1 8 . 0
1 9 . 0
2 0 .  0
2 1 .  0
o  ' 7  ( " j
2 3 .  0
2 4 .  0
2 5 .  0
2 6 .  0
2 7 .  0
2 8 .  0
2 9 .  0
3 0 .  0
3 1 . 0
3 2 .  0
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
40 x (other) =
0 . 1 n =
■6315 
1 0
h < x ) V
1 . 0 0.0492 -9.6385
2 . 0 0.1875 -8.0454
3. 0 0.3913 ~5.8072
4. 0 0.6316 —3 „ 4 7 3 3
5. 0 0.8824 -1.3659
6 » 0 1.1250 0.3964
7 . 0 1.3486 1.8102
8 . 0 1.5484 2.9196
9. 0 1.7234 3.7793
1 0 . 0 1.8750 4.4402
1 1 . 0 2.0055 4.9446
1 2 . 0 2.1176 5.3260
13. 0 2.2140 5.6104
14. 0 2.2969 5.8180
15. 0 2.3684 5.9642
16.0 2.4304 6.0609
17.0 2.4842 6.1175
18. 0 2.5313 6.1413
19. 0 2.5724 6.1380
2 0 . 0 2.6087 6.1123
2 1 . 0 2.6407 6.0676
2 2 . 0 2.6691 6.0071
23. 0 2.6944 cp ^
24. 0 2.7170 5.8478
25. 0 O  *\*̂ •yr o cr *7 cr cr
26. 0 2.7554 5.6487
27. 0 2.7719 5.5376
28. 0 2.7867 5.4200
29. 0 2„8002 5.2968
30. 0 o  q  1 ojL. 1 w  .1 jMt *mJ 5.1687
31 . 0 O Q*T *74. h w 4. O / 5.0363






R E S P O N S E
x h (X > V
1 .0 0.0492 ~9. 7075o 0 0.1875 ~S„ 4037
0 0.3913 -6 .Ci'"Tt2 0
4. 0 0.6316 ~4 „E2* *TJ
5. 0 0.8824 _O 6830
6 .0 1.1250 ™1 .1018
7,.o 1.3486 0 ..1. 910
8 .0 1.5484 1 .2219
9. 0 1.7234 0322
1 0 .0 1.8750 o 6634
1 1  .o 2.0055 "3* 1513
1 2 .0 2.1176 y 5253
13. 0 2.2140 -j. 8086
14. o 2,2969 4. 0195
15. o 2.3684 4. 1721
16. o 2.4304 4. 2776
17. o 2.4842 4. 3448
18. 0 H CT **T *4 T2 . jj 1 4. 3804
19. o /j. 4. 3899
2 0 .o 2.6087 4 . 3777
2 1 .0 2.6407 4. 3472o 0 2.6691 4. 3014
(!) 2.6944 4. 2426
24. o 2.7170 4. 1726
0 2.7372 4. 0930
26. 0 2.7554 4. 0051
27. o •y 7 7 | 9101
28. 0 2.7867 -jp 8088
29. 0 2.8002 7021
30. 0 2.8125 -jj. 5905
31 . 0 2.8237 71*«4748
p == 40 x (other) ~r = 0. 1 n =
a == 3.789473
F = 10
h (x ) V
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
i  .  0 0 . 0 4 9 2 - 9 . 7 5 4 4
2 . 0 0 . 1 8 7 5 ” 8 . 6 5 1 0
3 .  0 0 . 3 9 1 3 - 7 . 0 4 4 4
4 .  0 0 . 6 3 1 6 ~ 5 . 2 9 6 9
5 .  0 0 . 8 8 2 4 ” 3 . 6 5 1 5
6 .  0 1 . 1 2 5 0
_
7 .  0 1 . 3 4 8 6 - 1 . 0 3 7 8
8 . 0 1 . 5 4 8 4 “ 0 . 0 8 1 5
9 .  0 1 . 7 2 3 4 0 . 6 7 8 3
1 0 .  0 1 . 8 7 5 0 1 . 2 7 6 0
1  1  .  0 2 . 0 0 5 5 1 . 7 4 2 3
1 2 .  0 2 . 1 1 7 6 2 . 1 0 3 3
1 3 .  0 2 . 2 1 4 0 2 . 3 7 9 7
1 4 . 0 o  ^ o z . oj L  ii 7  O  / 2 . 5 8 8 2
1 5 .  0 2 . 3 6 8 4 2 . 7 4 1 8
1 6 .  0 2 . 4 3 0 4 2 . 8 5 0 8
1 7 . 0 2 . 4 8 4 2 2 . 9 2 3 3
1 8 .  0 2 . 9 6 5 8
1 9 .  0 2 . 5 7 2 4 2 . 9 8 3 4
2 0 .  0 2 . 6 0 8 7 2 . 9 8 0 2
2 1  .  0 2 . 6 4 0 7 2 . 9 5 9 6
o 2 . 6 6 9 1 2 . 9 2 4 2
2 3 .  0 2 . 6 9 4 4 2 . 8 7 6 3
2 4 .  0 2 . 7 1 7 0 2 . 8 1 7 7
2 5 .  0
~ 7  O
2 . 7 4 9 8
2 6 .  0 2 . 7 5 5 4 2 . 6 7 4 0
2 7 .  0 2 . 7 7  1 9 2 . 5 9 1 2
2 8 .  0 2 . 7 8 6 7 2 . 5 0 2 5
2 9 .  0 2 . 8 0 0 2 2 . 4 0 8 5
3 0 .  0 2 . 8 1 2 5 2 . 3 0 9 3
3 1 .  0 2 . 8 2 3 7 2 . 2 0 7 1
3 2 .  0 2 . 8 3 3 9 2 . 1 0 0 7
xi
R  =  4 0  x  ( o t h e r )  =  4
r = 0-1 n = 8
< 5  —  4 «
F =
B E S T





x h  ( x  ) V
1. 0 0.0492 -9.7884
2- 0 0.1875 -8.8319
3» 0 0.3913 -7.4244
4 - 0 0 .6316 ~5.8733
5. 0 0.8824 -4.3935
6 - 0 1.1250 -3.0925
7 - 0 1.3486 ~2.0021
8- 0 1.5484 -1.1136
9- 0 1.7234 -0.4017
10. 0 1.8750 0.1625
11. 0 2.0055 0.6060
12. 0 2.1176 0.9518
1 .  0 2.2140 1.2188
14. 0 2.2969 1.4221
15. 0 2.3684 1.5737
16. 0 2.4304 1.6832
17. 0 2.4842 1.7582
18. 0 2.5313 1.8047
19. 0 2.5724 1.8274
20. 0 2.6087 1.8304
21. 0 2.6407 1.8167
22. 0 2.6691 1.7890
23. 0 2.6944 1.7492
24. 0 2.7170 1.6992
25. 0 /*> •yt •yr 1.6404
26. 0 2.7554 1.5739
27. 0 2.7719 1.5008
23. 0 2.7867 1.4220
29. 0 2.8002 1.3380
30. 0 O  0  14L tt Q  X 1.2497
31 . 0 2.8237 1.1574
32. 0 2.8339 1 . 0616
B E S T







* h (x ) V
1. 0 0.0492 -9.8141
2. 0 0.1875 “8.9701
3» 0 0.3913 “7.7178
4.0 0.6316 “6.3239
5. 0 0„8824 “4.9802
6. 0 1.1250 “3.7875
7. 0 1.3486 “2.7791
a. o 1.5484 -1.9512
9. 0 1.7234 “ 1.2833
10. 0 1.8750 “0.7508
11.0 2.0055 ”0.3298
12. 0 2.1176 0.0004
13. 0 2.2140 0.2570
14.0 2.2969 0.4537
15. 0 2.3684 0.6018
16. 0 2.4304 0.7102
17. 0 2.4842 0.7858
18. 0 rn r “ *~r j  ~t-m jo 1 o 0.8344
19. 0 2.5724 0.8605
20. 0 2.6087 0.8677
21 . 0 2.6407 0.8591
22. 0 2.6691 0.8371
23. 0 2.6944 0.8036
24. 0 2.7170 0.7603
25. 0 0.7086
26. 0 2.7554 0.6496
27. 0 2.7719 0.5842
28. 0 2.7867 0.5133
29. 0 2.8002 0.4376
30. 0 2.8125 0.3576
31. 0 2. 82-77 0.2739
32. 0 2.8339 0.1868
P - 4 0  y, (other) = 4
r = 0.1 n ~ 10
a = 5 . 6 8 4 2 1 0
F = 1 0
B E S T
RESPONSE
>{ h (x ) V
1. 0 0.0492 -9.8342
2. 0 0.1875 ~9.0790
3. 0 0.3913 -7.9512
4. 0 0.6316 ~6.6858
5. 0 0.8824 —5.4558
6. 0 1.1250 -4.3554
7.0 1 „3486 -3.4185
8. 0 1.5484 -2.6444
9. 0 1.7234 -2.0166
10 „ 0 1.8750 ~1.5135
11 . 0 2.0055 ~1.1138
12. 0 2.1176 -0.7989
13. 0 2.2140 "0.5530
14. 0 2.2969 ~~0. 3633
15. 0 2.3684 -0.2195
16. 0 2.4304 -0.1133
17.0 2.4842 -0 . 0381
18.0 2.5313 0.0115
19. 0 2.5724 0.0396
20. 0 2.6087 0.0499
21 .  0 2.6407 0.0450
22. 0 2 . 6691 0.0274
23. 0 2.6944 -0 . 0012
24. 0 2.7170 --0 „ 0391
25 . 0 **n /-£ -0.0851
2 6 .  0 2 . 7554 -0.1381
2 7 ,  0 2 . 7 7 1 9 -0. 1 9 7 1
28. 0 2 . 7867 — O .  2 6 1  4
2 9 . 0 2.8002 — 0 . 3303
30. 0 2.8125 -“0. 4033
3 1  . 0 — 0 . 4799
32. 0 2 . 8339 -0.5597
B E S T





h (: x ) V
1 . 0 0 0492 -7. 2038r? 0 0 N1875 1 „3584
*.!> M0 0 M3913 8 .3891
4. 0 o »6316 1 2 .9055
5 „0 0 »8824 15. 6931
6 . 0 1 ft 1250 17. 43157 . 0 1 H3486 18. 5320
8 .0 1 M5484 19. 2316
9..0 1 M72:34 19. 6695
1 0 .0 1 „8750 19. 9302
1 1 „0 «0055 2 0 .0667
1 2 .0 U1176 2 0 . 1 138
13. 0 a2140 2 0 .0948
14. 0 o „2969 2 0 .0259
15. o o «3684 19. 9184
16. o r?It4304 19. 7808
17. 0 o »4842 19. 6191
18. 0 r?It5313 19. 4381
19. 0 „5724 19. 2412
2 0 .0 „6087 19. 0312
2 1 .0 f-yU6407 18. 8104
90 0 M6691 IS. 580307 o M6944 18. 3425
24. 0 „7170 18. 0981
25. 0 II 7372 17. 8479
26. o „7554 17. 5928
0 ••>„7719 17. 3337 ',
28. o «7867 17. 0701
29. 0 „8002 16. 8035
30. o a8125 16. 5340
31. o •*n* 8237 16. 2618
3 'T-' o O' 8339 15. 9874
B E S T
R E S P O N S E
40 X ( o t h e r )  =
0 .  1 
0.  75  
10
n =
h ( x ) V
1 . 0 0 . 0 4 9 2 ~ 8 . 9 2 4 3
2.  0 0 . 1 8 7 5 - 4 . 6 9 8 8
3,  0 0 . 3 9 1 3 0 . 1 9 2 6
4.  0 0 . 6 3 1 6 4 . 3 5 1 7
5.  0 0 . 8 8 2 4 7 . 4 8 7 3
6.  0 1 . 1 2 5 0 9 . 7 4 6 8
7.  0 1 . 3 4 8 6 1 1 . 3 5 2 0
8 . 0 1 . 5 4 8 4 1 2 . 4 8 8 2
9 . 0 1 . 7 2 3 4 1 3 . 2 9 0 6
10.  0 1 . 8 7 5 0 1 3 . 8 5 3 2
11.  0 2 . 0 0 5 5 1 4 . 2 4 1 1
1 2 . 0 2 . 1 1 7 6 1 4 . 4 9 9 5
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